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JUDGE AND JURY-INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS
Alexander M. Bickel *
A PRIOR conflict among the circuit courts over whether to
enter judgment of guilty on one count pursuant to a verdict
which is necessarily inconsistent with a verdict of not guilty on
another count was settled in 1932 by Dunn v. United States.'
The Supreme Court through Justice Holmes held that the verdicts
should stand despite the logical impossibility they embody. The
problem, one of wide implications in the administration of justice,
has its setting in the body of rules which establish a division of
functions between judge and jury.
In the Dunn case there was a criminal indictment in three
counts: (i) for maintaining a nuisance by keeping liquor for sale;
(2) for unlawfully possessing that liquor; and (3) for unlawfully
selling that liquor. There were acquittals on the second and third
counts but a verdict of guilty on the nuisance count. The Govern-
ment's evidence, which was the same on all three counts, tended
to prove that the defendant owned a place in which a sale was
made of whiskey ordinarily kept underneath a bar. The defendant
argued that a finding of possession was indispensable to a judgment
of guilty of maintaining a nuisance, and that since the verdicts on
counts (2) and (3) negatived possession, the conviction could not
stand. The Court, over the vigorous dissent of justice Butler,'
held that:
Consistency in the verdict is not necessary .... If separate indict-
ments had been presented against the defendant for possession and for
maintenance of a nuisance, and had been separately tried, the same
evidence being offered in support of each, an acquittal on one could not
be pleaded as res judicata of the other. Where the offenses are separately
charged in the counts of a single indictment, the same rule must hold.3
* Law Clerk for 1949-50 to Judge Calvert Magruder of United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit. B.S.S., College of the City of New York, 1947;
LL.B., Harvard, 1949.
1 284 U.S. 390.
2 Id. at 394.
3 Id. at 393.
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The appellate cases since 1932 have unflinchingly followed
Dunn. 4 And while no case has been found reversing a trial judge,
who is said to have the widest discretion in such matters,5 for
granting a new trial on the sole ground that inconsistent verdicts
resulted from the first one, such action by a trial court would seem
to be a rare thing indeed.5
However, there is an independent and recently reaffirmed line
of authority which indicates that the res judicata assumption
underlying Dunn was an erroneous one. And if that assumption
were the only basis of Dunn, on the theory that a defendant should
not benefit from the Government's generally desirable action of
joining several counts in one indictment rather than putting every-
one concerned to the trouble and expense of several trials, there
would be little left to say about the case except that it is plainly
wrong.
For the rules of res judicata apply fully in a criminal case.7 And
under those rules, if the verdict of acquittal had resulted from a
supposed separate trial on the possession count in Dunn, the Gov-
ernment would have been foreclosed from proving possession at a
later trial on the nuisance count.' In the recent case of Sealfon v.
United States,9 there had previously been an acquittal on a charge
of conspiracy to violate sugar rationing regulations by presenting
false invoices to a ration board. In the subsequent trial, the de-
fendant was convicted on an indictment charging the substantive
crime itself. The evidence was the same at both trials. The Court
unanimously reversed the conviction, holding that the Government
4 See, e.g., United States v. Denny, 165 F.2d 668, 670 (7th Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 333 U.S. 844 (1948) ; Pilgreen v. United States, X57 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1946);
Long v. United States, 90 F.2d 482 (gth Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 730 (1937).
There are numerous other cases in which the rule of Dunn is stated, hut in which no
real inconsistency can be said to have existed. E.g., Allen v. United States, 89 F.2d
954, 955 (4th Cir. 1937).
I See United States v. Socony Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150, 247 (1940).
' But see United States v. Kaadt, 31 F. Supp. 546, 547 (N.D. Ind. 1940) ("I
strongly feel that the jury should not blow both hot and cold in passing upon the
rights of a defendant in a criminal indictment . . ."; relying on the Butler dissent).
7 United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 87 (1916) (Holmes, J.).
' See, e.g., United States v. De Angelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943) ; United
States v. Clavin, 272 Fed. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1921) ("the acquittal is res judicata for
all purposes, upon every issue involved in the first indictment"). See RESTATE MNT,
JUDGMENTS § 68, comments c, m, n (1942). In conformance with the terminology of
the Court in the Dunn case, the term "res judicata" is employed in this paper to
cover both what is properly understood by that term and what may more ap-
propriately be called an instance of collateral estoppel.
S.332 U.S. 575 (1948).
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was barred from raising a second time issues of fact on which the
first jury must necessarily have found for the defendant. The
Sealfon case having thus conclusively underlined the error in the
Dunn opinion 10 it may seem that the latter case was overruled
sub silentio.11
The res judicata error made in Dunn, however, should not
cause that case to be overruled. For Dunn reached a result which
did no more than to reaffirm the now undoubted broad powers
juries won for themselves after their ancient struggles with the
English judges. Viewed thus, Dunn does not conflict with Sealfon.
The Court should not overrule Dunn, unless it is as disillusioned
with the jury system as are some writers, 2 and is willing to take
a step which it will later be unable to distinguish from other
radical encroachments on the jury's province.
The law states duties and liabilities in black and white terms.
Human actions are frequently not as clean-cut. Judges themselves
sometimes undertake, in sentencing, the search for a middle ground
between the absolutes of conviction and acquittal. To deny the
jury a share in this endeavor is to deny the essence of the jury's
function, which is finding a solution for those occasional hard cases
in which "law and justice do not coincide." " Dunn reaffirms the
1 Of course, the entire discussion is based on the assumption of true inconsist-
ency on the one hand, and true identity in the facts needed to support separate
trial verdicts on the other. Otherwise, neither the problem in .5ealjon nor that in
Dunn is reached. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); United
States v. Curzio, izo F.2d 354 (3 d Cir. 1948). See also note 4 supra.
" It appeared, when the Court last term granted certiorari in Petti v. United
States, 335 U.S. 811 (1948), that it might decide whether the conflict between Dunn
and Sealfon was a real one. In the Petti case, a verdict of not guilty on the charge
of transporting stolen securities in interstate commerce necessarily negatived the find-
ing of an intent to transport implicit in the verdict of guilty on a count alleging a
conspiracy to do so; for the only proof of the intent was the transportation itself.
It was argued for Petti that the inconsistent verdicts could not stand in view of
the effect of Sealfon on Dunn. But the Second Circuit held flatly that the Sealfon
decision "has no application to different counts in the same indictment or to con-
solidated indictments." 168 F.2d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 1948). Decision was frustrated
when the Court on the Government's motion remanded the case for a new trial on
another issue. 336 U.S. 916 (1949). See Petti v. United States, Supreme Court,
October Term 1948, No. iiS, Memorandum for the United Statei Consenting that
the Judgments below be Vacated and the Cause be Remanded to the District Court
for New Trial, Feb., 1949.
12 See FRAx, CouRTs ox TsR io8 et seq. (1949). But even as severe a critic
of juries as judge Frank has said that "as long as jury trials are guaranteed by
constitutional or statutory provisions, it is the obligation of every judge, no matter
what he thinks of such trials, to see . . . that the jury's province is not invaded."
See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., I5 F.2d 63x, 642, 6S5 (2d Cir. 1946).
"I See Fs.x, op. cit. supra note 12, at 127-28.
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jury's power to exercise leniency by limiting punishment to sentence
upon only one of many counts ' - even though in recognizing this
power the Court alluded to it as one to which the jury has no
"right." 15
Should Dunn be overruled, jurors who in the typical inconsist-
ent verdicts case presumably believe that, in the sense of having
done the act charged, the defendant is guilty,"6 would be strong-
armed into rendering an all-or-nothing verdict: innocent on all
counts, or guilty on all. This would be accomplished through in-
structions more peremptory than can be obtained now; or through
forced reconsideration; 17 or through new trials until a jury is
found which obeys instructions. Such a state of affairs would
prevail until the next logical step was taken and the jury's power
to acquit curtailed also.' At present Dunn permits a sensible
compromise between the necessity of convicting some likable
people, or defendants who have committed a momentarily popular
crime, and the tendency of juries to be reluctant to do so.
It seems likely, as was assumed by the Court, that a second
jury in Dunn would have viewed the evidence on the new trial as
had its predecessor, and, under strong instructions, would have
convicted on all counts. By the same token, if the first jury in the
Sealfon case had heard two counts rather than one indictment on
a single count, it would probably have acquitted on both. At any
rate, the Sealfon holding so assumes. Thus, in practical operation
the two cases express the same policy: they each give the defend-
ant the benefit of any break any single jury may wish him to have.
There are of course some reasons for changing the Dunn result
which are not grounded in the desire generally to narrow the func-
tion of the jury. Thus, if Dunn should be overruled, the Govern-
14 Judges do at times, even in "hard" cases, refuse to search for the middle
ground and impose stiff consecutive sentences where offenses arising out of one
criminal act are charged in many counts. See 45 HARv. L. REv. 931 (1932); 41
YAi, L.J. 922 (1932) (comments on Dunn case).
I5 See note 16 infra.
16 See Dunn v. United States, supra note i at 393, quoting from Steckler v.
United States, 7 F.2d 59, 6o (2d Cir. 1925): "[The inconsistency in the] verdict
shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their
real conclusions, but that does not show that they were not convinced of the de-
fendant's guilt. We interpret the acquittal as no more than their assumption of a
power which they had no right to exercise but to which they were disposed through
lenity."
2
7 Cf. Rmn. R. CIv. P. 49.
Is Cf. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 139, 139-40 (1920) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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ment might abandon the practice of throwing into an indictment
as many as thirty-three counts, which are very frequently not
necessary and can hopelessly confuse a trial; 19 for the possibility
of inconsistent verdicts (and, absent Dunn, of reversal) increases
in direct ratio to the number of counts. Further, it may be argued
that federal criminal statutes intended that the judge alone should
exercise the function of sentencing." And in a few cases the jury's
inconsistency is an unnecessary act for the judge is powerless to
impose consecutive sentences anyway.21 Finally, it may be thought
that inconsistency in verdicts is an unseemly phenomenon which
conduces to an unhealthy popular cynicism about the administra-
tion of justice.2 However, these relatively minor considerations
should not be determinative.
But the problem of Dunn may not receive its first thorough re-
examination in one of the clean-cut cases in which there is a single
criminal defendant. And a substantial variation, bringing into
play new policy factors, develops in criminal cases where guilt is
derivative and verdicts are inconsistent as they affect the master
on the one hand and the servant or agent on the other.3 Or the
question of Dunn v. United States may come up in a civil case.
The opponents of the jury system maintain with particular vigor
that, whatever their doubtful value in criminal prosecutions,
"9 See, e.g., Loney v. United States, I51 F.2d i, 4 (ioth Cir. i945). But in some
cases numerous counts are genuinely necessary to cover all possible phases of the
evidence, and no inconsistent verdicts can result from them. See, e.g., Crichton v.
United States, 92 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 702 (1937).
20 The judge is given discretion to impose sentence, to suspend it, to let
sentences run concurrently, etc. He can impose an unexpectedly stiff sentence, and
thus have the last word, even where the jury expresses a desire for leniency by its
inconsistency. E.g., United States v. Porter, 96 F.2d 773 (7th Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 305 U.S. 612 (1938).
21 This is true where, although prosecution for two offenses arising out of the
same act is not prohibited by the double jeopardy clause, consecutive sentences
nevertheless are, because the so-called larger offense includes all the elements of the
so-called smaller one. See Ekberg v. United States, 167 F.2d 380 (ist Cir. 1948).
But consecutive sentences are possible in most other cases, such as where one count
charges a conspiracy to commit a crime and another charges the crime itself, since
one can be guilty of either without first being guilty of the other, although it may
be impossible to prove one without evidence which supports the other also.
22 And yet, the apocryphal verdict, "We find the boy what stole the car not
guilty, your Honor," may be "unseemly," "unlawful," but still just.
21 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943) (Dunn rule
applied to verdicts that the corporation's officers were guilty and the corporation
not guilty of offense committed by officers acting in corporate capacity); United
States v. St. Louis Dairy Co., 79 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Mo. 1948), 62 HARv. L. REv.
513 (1949) (converse facts).
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juries are certainly an outmoded encumbrance in civil trials; and
it may be pointed out with force that in civil cases the courts
generally exercise more control over the jury's tendency to be illog-
ical (and yet perhaps not unreasonable) than in criminal cases.
Thus, compromise verdicts are not allowed "in civil suits, and where
an inconsistency in the jury's verdict is brought to light by means
of special interrogatories, which the jury must answer, it is not
allowed to stand, and the latter control, or, if they, too, are con-
tradictory, there is reconsideration or a new trial.2" Many states
allow additurs when the jury, having found liability, awards
damages which in light of the evidence are too low; but, for
formal reasons which have been severely criticized, the federal
courts do not. 5 Again, in many states, and this time in the federal
courts as well, remittiturs are given when the jury's damages
appear to be too high.26 And there is not in a civil case the equiva-
lent of a precedent such as Dunn to overrule in upsetting incon-
sistent verdicts.2 T The argument outlined against extending the
Dunn rule to civil cases is thus quite a plausible one. But it is
not unanswerable.
Federal Rule 49 on special interrogatories, which by analogy
presents a strong argument against Dunn, is directed at instances
of confusion and manifest misapprehension by the jury of the
issues,"8 and not at what is a deliberate exercise by the jury of a
power "to which they were disposed through lenity." 29 Com-
promise verdicts are distinguished in a similar way from incon-
sistent ones. ° The jury will render a compromise verdict, by
definition, when it could not as an entity make up its collective
mind on the issue of liability itself; that is, the jury is hung.
Where the verdicts are inconsistent, the explanation is that the
jury as a whole was convinced that liability existed, but con-
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 49-
25 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935) (5-4).
28 See, e.g., Brooks Transp. Co. v. McCutcheon, 154 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
27 There is a surprising dearth of authority on the force of the Dunn rule in
civil suits. But there are dicta indicating approval of it. See, e.g., Jayne v. Mason
and Dixon Lines, X24 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1941). But cf. Note, Inconsistent
Verdicts in Civil Trials, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1230 (1932) (master-servant cases in
state courts).
28 See, e.g., Mounger v. Wells, 30 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1929); see 3 MooRa,
FEDERAL. PRACTICE §§ 49.02, 49.03, p. 31oo n.5 (1938).
29 See note 16 supra. Inconsistent verdicts are often accompanied by a recom-
mendation of leniency. See, e.g., United States v. Albers, xi5 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1940).
20 See Steckler v. United States, 7 F.2d 5g, 6o (2d Cir. 1925) (L. Hand, J.).
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sidered mitigating circumstances or other factors which moved it,
again as a whole, not to impose the full consequences of the deci-
sion it had reached. These distinctions are not insignificant; the
fundamental notion is that parties to a law suit are entitled to the
true, unclouded judgment of all twelve jurymen, and that only
when it is plainly evident that the verdict does not in fact embody
the considered, final, and individual decisions of all twelve jurors
will it be upset, other infirmities to the side.
The difference between compromise and "confused" verdicts
on the one hand, and inconsistent ones on the other, is illumined
by cases such as Fairmount Glass Works v. Cub Fork Coal Co."
In this accident case the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff with
damages in the amount of one dollar, although the evidence it
must have believed in finding for the plaintiff showed that damages
ran to $2000 and more. The judgment entered on the verdict was
affirmed, the Court stating that the jury had not compromised on
a verdict, but, believing the plaintiff's story, had deliberately exer-
cised its discretion to see to it that costs would be all he got.
Justice Brandeis cited Dunn v. United States by way of analogy.
It should be remembered also that additurs are in fact not granted
in the federal courts.
In cases where a remittitur is appropriate, the jury, instead of
treating the defendant with irrational kindness, pounces on him
with undue ferocity. This is akin to a display of passion and
prejudice.32 A jury's indulgence of feelings of vindictiveness, and
its exercise of leniency in the light of what it considers mitigating
circumstances, are of course two quite distinct things. The one is
a departure from, the other is of the essence of, the jury's role in
seeing that the individual gets justice with mercy even in those
special cases in which the rigid and sometimes stern (because
necessarily generalized) rules provide neither.
31 287 U.S. 474 (i933); Chambers v. Skelly Oil Co., 87 F.2d 853 (ioth Cir.
1937). See also Columbia Cas. Co. v. Tibma, 63 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1933). Cf.
United States Potash Co. v. McNutt, 7o F.2d 126, 132 (ioth Cir. X934).
32 See, e.g., Brabham v. Mississippi, 96 F.2d 210, 234 (sth Cir. 3938). And
note how reluctant courts are to exercise even their well-established power to
upset verdicts on the ground of passion and prejudice. Cf. Houston Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Kelley, 131 F.2d 627, 628 (5th Cir. 1942).
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